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Psychology faces a replication crisis. The Reproducibility Project: Psychology sought to replicate
the effects of 100 psychology studies. Though 97% of the original studies produced statistically
significant results, only 36% of the replication studies did so (Open Science Collaboration, 2015).
This inability to replicate previously published results, however, is not limited to psychology
(Ioannidis, 2005). Replication projects in medicine (Prinz et al., 2011) and behavioral economics
(Camerer et al., 2016) resulted in replication rates of 25 and 61%, respectively, and analyses in
genetics (Munafò, 2009) and neuroscience (Button et al., 2013) question the validity of studies in
those fields. Science, in general, is reckoning with challenges in one of its basic tenets: replication.
Comparative psychology also faces the grand challenge of producing replicable research.
Though social psychology has born the brunt of most of the critique regarding failed replications,
comparative psychology suffers from some of the same problems faced by social psychology (e.g.,
small sample sizes). Yet, comparative psychology follows the methods of cognitive psychology by
often using within-subjects designs, which may buffer it from replicability problems (Open Science
Collaboration, 2015). In this Grand Challenge article, I explore the shared and unique challenges of
and potential solutions for replication and reproducibility in comparative psychology.
1. REPLICABILITY AND REPRODUCIBILITY: DEFINITIONS AND
CHALLENGES
Researchers often use the terms replicability and reproducability interchangeably, but it is useful to
distinguish between them. Replicability is “re-performing the experiment and collecting new data,”
whereas reproducibility is “re-performing the same analysis with the same code using a different
analyst” (Patil et al., 2016). Therefore, one can replicate a study or an effect (outcome of a study)
but reproduce results (data analyses). Each of these three efforts face their own challenges.
1.1. Replicating Studies
Though science depends on replication, replication studies are rather rare due to an emphasis on
novelty: journal editors and reviewers value replication studies less than original research (Neuliep
and Crandall, 1990, 1993). This culture is changing with funding agencies (Collins and Tabak,
2014) and publishers (Association for Psychological Science, 2013; McNutt, 2014) adopting policies
that encourage replications and reproducible research. The recent wave of replications, however,
has resulted in a backlash, with replicators labeled as bullies, ill-intentioned, and unoriginal
(Bartlett, 2014; Bohannon, 2014). Much of this has played out in opinion pieces, blogs, social
media, and comment sections, leading some to allege a culture of “shaming” and “methodological
intimidation” (Fiske, 2016). Nevertheless, replication studies are becoming more common, with
some journals specifically soliciting them (e.g., Animal Behavior and Cognition, Perspectives on
Psychological Science).
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1.2. Replicating Effects
When studies are replicated, the outcomes do not always match
the original studies’ outcomes. This may result from differences
in design and methods between the original and replication
studies or from a false negative in the replication (Open Science
Collaboration, 2015). However, it also may occur because the
original study was a false positive; that is, the original result
was spurious. Unfortunately, biases in how researchers decide
on experimental design, data analysis, and publication can
produce results that fail to replicate. At many steps in the
scientific process, researchers can fall prey to confirmation
bias (Wason, 1960; Nickerson, 1998) by focusing on positive
confirmations of hypotheses. At the experimental design stage,
researchers may develop tests that attempt to confirm rather
than disconfirm hypotheses (Sohn, 1993). This typically relies
on null hypothesis significance testing, which is frequently
misunderstood and misapplied by researchers (Nickerson, 2000;
Wagenmakers, 2007) and focuses on a null hypothesis rather than
alternative hypotheses. At the data collection phase, researchers
may perceive behavior in a way that aligns with their expectations
rather than the actual outcomes (Marsh and Hanlon, 2007).
When analyzing data, researchers may report results that confirm
their hypotheses while ignoring disconfirming results. This “p-
hacking” (Simmons et al., 2011; Simonsohn et al., 2014) generates
an over-reporting of results with p-values just under 0.05
(Masicampo and Lalande, 2012) and is a particular problem for
psychology (Head et al., 2015). Finally, after data are analyzed,
studies with negative or disconfirming results may not get
published, causing the “file drawer problem” (Rosenthal, 1979).
This effect could also result in under-reporting of replication
studies when they fail to find the same effects as the original
studies.
1.3. Reproducing Results
“An article [...] in a scientific publication is not the scholarship
itself, it is merely advertising of the scholarship. The actual
scholarship is the complete software development environment
and the complete set of instructions which generated the figures”
(Buckheit and Donoho, 1995, p. 59, emphasis in the original).
There are many steps between collecting data and generating
statistics and figures reported in a publication. For research to
be truly reproducible, researchers must open that entire process
to scrutiny. Currently, this is not possible for most publications
because the relevant information is not readily accessible to
other scientists. For example, in a survey of 441 biomedical
articles from 2000 to 2014, only one was fully reproducible (Iqbal
et al., 2016). When data and the code generating analyses are
unavailable, this prevents truly reproducible research.
2. UNIQUE CHALLENGES FOR
COMPARATIVE PSYCHOLOGY
In addition to the general factors contributing to the replication
crisis across science, working with non-human animals poses
unique challenges for comparative psychology.
• Small sample sizes—With over 7 billion humans on the
planet, many areas of psychology have a large population
to draw from for research participants. Indeed, given that
undergraduate students comprise most of the psychology
study participants (Arnett, 2008) and that most colleges and
universities have hundreds to tens of thousands of students,
recruiting psychology study subjects is relatively easy. Yet,
for comparative psychologists, large sample sizes can prove
more challenging to acquire due to low numbers of individual
animals in captivity, regulations limiting research, and the
expense of maintaining colonies of animals. These small
sample sizes can prove problematic, potentially resulting in
spurious results (Agrillo and Petrazzini, 2012).
• Repeated testing—For researchers studying human
psychology, colleges and universities refresh the subject
pool with a cohort of new students every year. The effort,
expense, and logistics of acquiring new animals for a
comparative psychology lab, however, can be prohibitive.
Therefore, for many labs working with long-lived species,
such as parrots, corvids, and primates, researchers test
the same individuals repeatedly. Repeated testing can
result in previous experimental histories influencing
behavioral performance, which can impact the ability
of other researchers to replicate results based on these
individuals.
• Exploratory data analysis—Having few individuals may also
drive researchers to extract as much data as possible from
subjects. Collecting large amounts of data and conducting
extensive analysis on those data is not problematic itself.
However, if these analyses are conducted without sufficient
forethought and a priori predictions (Anderson et al., 2001;
Wagenmakers et al., 2012), exploratory analyses can result in
“data-fishing expeditions” (Bem, 2000; Wagenmakers et al.,
2011) that produce false positives.
• Species coverage—Historically, comparative psychology has
focused on a few species, primarily pigeons, mice, and
rats (Beach, 1950). Though these species are still the
workhorses of the discipline, comparative psychology has
enjoyed a robust broadening of the pool of species studied
(Shettleworth, 2009, Figure 1). Beach (1950) showed that,
in Journal of Comparative Psychology, researchers studied
about 14 different species a year from 1921 to 1946. From
1983 to 1987, the same journal published studies on 102
different species and, from 2010 to 2015, 144 different species1
(Figure 1).
The increase in species studied is clearly advantageous to
the field because it expands the scope of our understanding
across a wide range of taxa. But it also has the disadvantage of
reducing the depth of coverage for each species, and depth is
required for replication. In Journal of Comparative Psychology
from 1983 to 1987, researchers published 2.3 articles per
species. By 2010-2015, that number dropped to 1.8 articles per
species. From 1983 to 1987, 62 species were studied in a single
article during that 5-year span, whereas from 2010 to 2015,
1I downloaded from Web of Science citation information from all articles
published in Journal of Comparative Psychology (JCP) from 1983 (when Journal
of Comparative and Physiological Psychology separated into JCP and Behavioral
Neuroscience) to 1987 (N = 235) and from 2010 to 2015 (N= 254). Based on the
title and abstract, I coded the species tested in all empirical papers. Data and the R
script used to analyze the data are available as supplementary materials.
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FIGURE 1 | Changes in species studied in Journal of Comparative Psychology from 1983 to 1987 and from 2010 to 2015. (A) shows the frequency of
taxonomic groups included in empirical articles for both time periods. Because the time periods differed in the number of articles published, the percent of species
included in all articles is presented. (B) shows a subset of the data that includes the top 10 most frequently studied species for each time period. *Top 10 most
frequent from 1983 to 1987. ∧Top 10 most frequent from 2010 to 2015.
103 species were studied only in a single article. Some of the
species tested are quite rare, which can limit access to them.
For example, Gartner et al. (2014) explored personality in
clouded leopards, which have fewer than 10,000 individuals in
the wild (Grassman et al., 2016) and fewer than 200 in captivity
(Wildlife Institute of India, 2014). Expanding comparative
psychology to a wide range of species spreads out resources,
making replication less likely.
• Substituting species—When attempting to replicate or
challenge another study’s findings, comparative psychologists
sometimes turn to the most convenient species to test rather
than testing the species used in the original study. This is
problematic because substituting a different species is not a
direct replication (Schmidt, 2009; Makel et al., 2012), and it is
not clear what a failure to replicate or an alternative outcome
means across species. Even within a species, strains of mice
and rats, for instance, vary greatly in their behavior. Thus, for
comparative psychology, a direct replication requires testing
the same species and/or strain to match the original study as
closely as possible.
3. RESOLVING THE CRISIS
The replicability crisis in psychology has spawned a number of
solutions to the problems (Wagenmakers, 2007; Frank and Saxe,
2012; Koole and Lakens, 2012; Nosek et al., 2012; Wagenmakers
et al., 2012; Asendorpf et al., 2013). In addition to encouraging
more direct replications, these solutions address the problems of
null hypothesis significance testing, p-hacking, and reproducing
analyses.
3.1. Null Hypothesis Significance Testing
• Effect sizes—Despite decades of warnings about the perils
of null hypothesis significance testing (Rozeboom, 1960;
Gigerenzer, 1998; Marewski and Olsson, 2009), psychology
has been slow to move away from this tradition. However,
a number of publishers in psychology have begun requiring
or strongly urging authors to include effect sizes in their
statistical analyses. This diverts focus from the binary notion
of “significant” or “not significant” to a description of the
strength of effects.
• Bayesian inference—Another recent trend is to abandon
significance testing altogether and switch to Bayesian statistics.
While significance testing yields the probability of the data
given a hypothesis (Cohen, 1990), a Bayesian approach
provides the probability of a hypothesis given the data, which
is what researchers typically seek (Wagenmakers, 2007). A key
advantage of this approach is that it offers the strength of
evidence favoring one hypothesis over another.
• Multiple hypotheses—Rather than testing a single hypothesis
against a null, researchers can make stronger inferences by
developing and testing multiple hypotheses (Chamberlin,
1890; Platt, 1964). Information-theoretic approaches
(Burnham and Anderson, 2010) and Bayesian inference
(Wagenmakers, 2007) allow researchers to test the strength of
evidence among these hypotheses.
3.2. P-Hacking
• Labeling confirmatory and exploratory analyses—
Confirmatory data analysis tests a priori hypotheses.
Analyzing data after observing the data, however, is
exploratory analysis. Though exploratory analysis is not
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 May 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 862
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inherently ‘bad’, it is disingenuous and statistically invalid
to treat exploratory analyses as confirmatory analyses
(Wagenmakers et al., 2011, 2012). To clarify between these
types of analyses, researchers should clearly label confirmatory
and exploratory analyses. Also, researchers can convert
exploratory analyses to confirmatory analyses by collecting
follow-up data to replicate the exploratory effects.
• Pre-registration—A more rigorous way for researchers to
avoid p-hacking and data-fishing expeditions is to commit
to specific data analyses before collecting data. Researchers
can pre-register their studies at pre-registration websites
(e.g., https://aspredicted.org/) by specifying in advance the
research questions, variables, experimental methods, and
planned analyses (Wagenmakers et al., 2012). Registered
reports take this a step forward by subjecting the pre-
registration to peer review. Journals that allow registered
reports agree that “manuscripts that survive pre-study peer
review receive an in-principle acceptance that will not
be revoked based on the outcomes”, though they may
be rejected for other reasons (Center for Open Science,
2016).
3.3. Reproducing Analyses
• Archiving data and analyses—A first step toward reproducing
data analysis is to archive the data (and a description of it)
publicly, which allows other researchers to access the data for
their own analyses. An important second step is to archive
a record of the analysis itself. Many software packages allow
researchers to output the scripts that generate the analyses.
The statistical software package R (R Core Team, 2017) is
free, publicly available software that allows researchers to
save scripts of the statistical analysis. Archiving the data
and R scripts makes the complete data analysis reproducible
by anyone without requiring costly software licenses. Data
repositories, such as Dryad (http://datadryad.org/) and
Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/) archive these
files.
• Publishing workflows—The process from developing a research
question to submitting a manuscript for publication takes
many steps and long periods of time, usually on the order
of years. A perfectly reproducible scientific workflow would
track each step of this process and make them available
for others to access (Nosek et al., 2012). Websites, such as
the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/) can manage
scientific workflows for projects by providing researchers
a place to store literature, IRB materials, experimental
materials (stimuli, software scripts), data, analysis scripts,
presentations, and manuscripts. This workflow management
system allows researchers to collaborate remotely and make
the materials publicly available for other researchers to
access.
3.4. Replicability in Comparative
Psychology
Comparative psychologists can improve the rigor and
replicability by following these general recommendations.
However, a number of practices specific to the field will improve
our scientific rigor.
• Multi-species studies—Though many comparative psychology
studies have smaller samples sizes than is ideal, testing
multiple species in a study can boost sample size. Journal of
Comparative Psychology showed an increase in the number
of species tested per article from 1.2 in 1983–1987 to 1.5 in
2010–2015. Many of these studies explore species differences
in learning and cognition, but they can also act as replications
across species.
• Multi-lab collaborations—To investigate the replication
problem in human psychology, researchers replicate studies
across different labs (Klein et al., 2014; Open Science
Collaboration, 2015). Multi-lab collaborations are more
challenging for comparative psychologists because there
is a limited number of other facilities with access to the
species under investigation. Nevertheless, comparative
psychologists do engage in collaborations testing the
same species in different facilities (e.g., Addessi et al.,
2013). A more recent research strategy is to conduct
the same experimental method across a broad range of
species in different facilities (e.g., MacLean et al., 2014).
Again, though these studies are often investigating species
differences, showing similarities across species acts as a
replication.
• Accessible species—Captive animal research facilities are
increasingly under pressure due to increased costs and
changing regulations and funding priorities. In the last decade,
many animal research facilities have closed, and researchers
have turned to more accessible species, especially dogs.
Because researchers do not have to house people’s pets, the
costs of conducting research on dogs is much lower than
maintaining an animal facility. A key advantage of dog
research is that they are abundant, with about 500 million
individuals worldwide (Coren, 2012). This allows ample
opportunities for large sample sizes. Moreover, researchers
are opening dog cognition labs all over the world, which
provides the possibility of multi-lab collaborations and
replications.
• Accessible facilities—Another alternative to maintaining
animal research facilities is to leverage existing animal
colonies. Zoos provide a wide variety of species to study
and are available in many metropolitan areas. Though the
sample sizes per species may be low, collaboration across zoos
is possible. Animal sanctuaries provide another avenue for
studying more exotic species, potentially with large sample
sizes.
In summary, like all of psychology and science in general,
comparative psychology can improve its scientific rigor
by rewarding and facilitating replication, strengthening
statistical methods, avoiding p-hacking, and ensuring
that our methods, data, and analyses are reproducible. In
addition, comparative psychologists can use field-specific
strategies, such as testing multiple species, collaborating across
labs, and using accessible species and facilities to improve
replicability.
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Frontiers in Comparative Psychology will continue to
publish high-quality research exploring the psychological
mechanisms underlying animal behavior (Stevens, 2010).
To help meet the grand challenge of replicability and
reproducability in comparative psychology, I highly
encourage authors to (1) conduct and submit replications
of their own or other researchers’ studies, (2) participate
in cross-lab collaborations, (3) pre-register methods
and data analysis, (4) use robust statistical methods,
(5) clearly delineate confirmatory and exploratory
analyses/results, and (6) publish data and statistical scripts
with their research articles and on data repositories.
Combining these solutions can ensure the validity of our
science and the importance of animal research for the
future.
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